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Introduction
Privatizations have become an important part of industrial restructuring in all parts of the world. Since 1990, European governments have sold more than $450 billion-worth of state assets in many different sectors, including the banking, insurance, telecommunication and automobile industries. Many countries also announce substantial forthcoming privatizations. 1 In what follows, with privatizations we refer to the selling of state assets. This deÞnition incorporates the selling of state owned enterprises but also includes cases where the government has stepped in to rescue a failing Þrm which has later been sold off. In South Korea, for instance, the government has recently sold the failing car producers Daewoo and Kia. trade liberalization. 3 This suggests that the outcome of the sale of the state assets will interact with the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade. The purpose of this paper is to analyze this interaction. To this end,
we consider a two-country partial equilibrium model. At the outset, a stateowned enterprise and a privately owned domestic Þrm are located in the domestic market. There is also a foreign Þrm located in a foreign country. It is assumed that the government in the domestic country will deregulate the market through a program with two distinct measures: (i) selling the state assets, and (ii) allowing
for new plants to be opened by foreigners, i.e. allowing for greenÞeld investments by reducing investment restrictions. In the Þrst stage, the state assets are sold at a simultaneous bid auction, where the two private Þrms are potential buyers. 4 In the second stage, the foreign Þrm can expand by investing greenÞeld, i.e. setting up a new plant, if it did not obtain the state assets in the Þrst stage. In the third stage, the Þrms sell a homogenous product and the foreign Þrm faces a trade cost in addition to its normal production costs, if it has not invested in the market. . 4 In this case, the identity of the buyer affects the proÞts of all Þrms. This interdependence constitutes a fundamental difficulty when determining the buyer, since the price a potential buyer is willing to pay for the assets depends on who might otherwise obtain them. Our study will use the approach taken by , who analyze auctions where the bidders' valuations of an auctioned item depend on the other bidders' identities. 5 It is not necessary to assume greenÞeld investment to previously have been forbidden, what is required is that greenÞeld costs have initially been high enough to prevent greenÞeld entry and that such costs might be reduced.
Moreover, for the main results in the paper, it is not necessary to assume that the privatization takes place before the greenÞeld investment liberalization. What is required, is that, at the time of the deregulation, the foreign Þrm is located outside the domestic market.
Our main result is that low greenÞeld costs and low trade cost induce foreign acquisitions. This seems counterintuitive at Þrst sight, since lower greenÞeld costs would be expected to lead to more greenÞeld entry rather than entry by acquisition, and that lower trade costs would lead to more exports rather than entry. 6 However, this result is intuitive, when taking into account that the levels of greenÞeld costs and trade costs affect the acquisition price. In order to explain the effect of the trade cost, consider a situation where greenÞeld costs are high enough to prevent greenÞeld entry. In this situation, the domestic Þrm is willing to pay a high price for the state assets when trade costs are high, since the foreign Þrm must then export facing high trade costs. However, when trade costs are low, the domestic Þrm can no longer prevent the foreign Þrm from becoming a strong competitor and thus, its willingness to pay for the state assets decreases.
Similarly, when greenÞeld cost are low, the domestic Þrm cannot prevent the foreign Þrm from becoming a locally strong competitor and thus, its willingness to pay for the state assets is low. Consequently, a foreign acquisition becomes more likely when trade and greenÞeld costs are low. 7 Acquisitions by foreign Þrms in privatizations are not only quantitatively signiÞcant; in policy making they are also often viewed differently than those made by domestic Þrms. For instance, many countries restrict the right of foreign individuals and Þrms to acquire domestic Þrms, or apply special restrictions to foreign Þrms in certain industries. On the other hand, many countries negotiate over so called "National Treatment" (NT) clauses, which set out the commitments of countries to treat foreign-controlled Þrms operating in their territories no less 6 See, for instance, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (1998) and Motta (1992) for papers dealing with the trade off between exports and FDI. 7 Horn and Persson (2000) showed that domestic Þrms have incentives to merge for sufficiently high trade barriers in order to prevent international mergers in a merger formation model without greenÞeld investment.
favorably than domestic enterprises in similar situations. 8 In the policy debate, NT has been questioned on the ground that it might lead to FDI which "crowd out" domestic investments and shift proÞts from domestic to foreign Þrms. 9 Moreover, it has been shown in the theoretical literature on
MNEs that FDI, under some circumstances, can reduce domestic welfare due to proÞt shifts from domestic to foreign Þrms. 10 Here, we will illuminate this issue in the context of privatizations. We show that crowding out is partly mitigated when entry takes place through an acquisition. The reason is that the foreign Þrm pays a price for the state assets equal to the domestic Þrm's valuation of the assets. But the domestic Þrm's valuation of the assets is precisely the negative impact on this Þrm through the decline in proÞts created by the foreign acquisition. This result illustrates a fundamental difference between foreign entry in the context of acquisition and greenÞeld investment. In the case where only greenÞeld entry is an option, the foreign Þrm will pay a Þxed entry cost which only covers the opportunity cost in terms of factor inputs. However, the negative effect on the domestic Þrm's proÞt is not "paid for". Consequently, the argument that a national treatment clause will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting proÞts from domestic agents to foreign Þrms seems less relevant when applied to privatizations. 8 For instance, Bolivia and the United States signed a bilateral treaty in April 1998 including a national treatment clause. Article II.1 in this treaty states: "With respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of covered investments, each Party shall accord treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like situations, to investments in its territory of its own nationals or companies (hereinafter "national treatment")..." (World Investment Report 1999). 9 See World Investment Report 1999. Moreover, deregulation and privatization was one of the main subjects discussed in the pre-UNCTAD X Seminar 1999. 10 See, for instance, Horstmann and Markusen (1992) . Note that FDI increases domestic welfare in many circumstances in these models.
The related theoretical literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational enterprises (MNE) is surveyed in Markusen (1995) . However, this literature does not explicitly address the question of whether entry into a foreign market is greenÞeld or through the acquisition of assets already in the market, or both.
This issue is at focus in our study, however. 11 Furthermore, to our knowledge, no paper in the privatization literature deals with determining the equilibrium buyer in a situation where the potential buyers compete in an international oligopoly.
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The model is spelled out in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium market structure. In Section 4, we make some observations concerning privatization, investment and trade policies. Section 5 discusses the robustness of some of the results in the paper. Section 6 concludes. Finally, most proofs appear in the Appendix.
The Model
There are two countries, country H and country F. At the outset, a state-owned enterprise and a privately owned domestic Þrm, Þrm d, are located in a market in country H. There is also a foreign Þrm, Þrm f , located in country F. In the following, we shall focus the analysis on the market in country H. It is assumed that the government in country H will liberalize the market through a program 11 The paper by Horn and Persson (2000) is related to our study, but in that paper, FDI takes place only by acquistions. See Bjorvatn (2000) and Görg (1997) for papers addressing the choice of entry mode into foreign markets. However, in these models, a foreign Þrm is exogenously assigned to be the acquirer. Thus, the equilibrium buyer is not endogenously determined. 12 For overviews of the privatization literature see, for instance, Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997) and Vickers and Yarrow (1991) . Cornelli and Li (1997) analyze the optimal schemes for privatization of state enterprises when foreign investors are potential buyers. However, they do not explicitly model the product market, and thus abstract from how the privatization outcome interacts with FDI and trade.
with two distinct measures: (i) selling the state assets, and (ii) allowing for new plants to be opened by foreigners, i.e. allowing for greenÞeld investments by abolishing investment restrictions. It is not necessary to assume that greenÞeld investments were previously forbidden. What is required is that the greenÞeld costs have initially been high enough to prevent greenÞeld entry and that such costs might be reduced. 13 As illustrated in Þgure 2.1, the interaction takes place in three stages. In the Þrst stage, the government sells the state assets, denoted k S , in one piece at an auction where the domestic Þrm and the foreign Þrm are the two potential buyers.
In the second stage, the foreign Þrm has the option to invest in new private assets, denoted k P , in country H, i.e. to undertake greenÞeld investments. In order to simplify the analysis, investment is assumed to be a dichotomous choice. 14 Finally, in the third stage, both Þrms sell a homogenous product in the market in country H and the foreign Þrm faces a trade cost in addition to its normal production costs, unless it has invested greenÞeld. 15 Section 2.1 describes the oligopoly market, and the following section presents the privatization procedure. 13 Note also that it is of no consequence whether the market was previously open to imports or not. 14 It can be shown that the main Þndings in this paper would also be valid when capital is a continuous variable. However, the derivations then become much more tedious. 15 The choice of timing between the acquisition and the greenÞeld investment is not obvious in a general setting. In this particular application, however, it seems natural for the acquisition decision to be made before the foreign Þrm's greenÞeld decision, since the assets for sale already exist in the market and entering greenÞeld requires the construction of a new plant, which is usually time consuming.
Note also that for the results in this paper, it is not necessary to assume that privatization takes place before the greenÞeld investment liberalization. What is required, is that the foreign Þrm is located outside the country at the time of the deregulation. 
The Oligopoly market
In the third stage, Þrms compete in Cournot fashion in a homogenous good market. We assume Þrms to face a concave inverse demand function, so that P 0 (Q) < 0 and P 00 (Q) ≤ 0. Initially, each Þrm possesses one unit of private assets k P in its respective home country. In Lemma 1, it is shown that the state assets will be sold at the auction in equilibrium. As illustrated by Þgure 2.1, this implies that three different market structures are to be considered. 16 To keep track of these, we denote the market structure where the domestic Þrm possesses k d units of assets and the foreign Þrm possesses k f units in country H, by
For example, 16 Note that a merger between the domestic and the foreign Þrm is ruled out. There are two basic ways in which a monopoly can be ruled out. One is to assume that the monopoly makes a smaller proÞt than the combined proÞts of less concentrated structures. The second reason why a monopoly may not be formed is that such a merger would not be permitted by the competition authorities. For simplicity, we stick to the latter interpretation.
is then the duopoly where the domestic Þrm owns both private assets and the state assets, while the foreign Þrm has no assets in country H and exports from country F.
The last row in Þgure 2.1 refers to the Þrms' marginal costs in the different market structures. A Þrm possessing at least one unit of assets is assumed to produce at zero marginal cost. However, the foreign Þrm has a cost disadvantage, t, per unit of output when serving the market from country F, where t captures the trade cost. We assume that the foreign Þrm can avoid trade costs when owning assets in country H, which can be achieved by acquiring the state assets k S or entering greenÞeld. 17 To highlight the trade cost effects, we assume that expanding above one unit of assets entails no production cost reduction.
Let π D i (t) denote the duopoly proÞt for Þrm i = d, f when the domestic Þrm faces a variable cost of zero and the foreign Þrm faces a variable cost of t, and let t max be the t satisfying q f (t) = 0. π M denotes the monopoly proÞt when the monopolist faces a zero production cost.
The greenfield investments
At this stage, the foreign Þrm might undertake a greenÞeld investment at a Þxed cost G, if it did not obtain the state assets in period 1. The foreign Þrm then lowers its costs from t to 0, by investing greenÞeld. DeÞneḠ(t) as the value of the greenÞeld cost, such that the foreign Þrm is indifferent between the alternatives of supplying the market by exports, or by investing in new assets, k P , and producing 17 Note that operating a new plant and operating the formerly state owned enterprise incur the same marginal cost. A Þrm is then implicitly assumed to also possess a Þrm-speciÞc asset in terms of technology. This technology can then easily be transferred to different production units within the Þrm (see, Markusen (1995) ). Even if there were a symmetric Þxed cost associated with restructuring the state-assets to make them as efficient as the new assets, the results in this section would still hold.
for the market locally. Formally, we thus have:
Since export proÞts π D f (t) decrease monotonically in t, the critical greenÞeld cost G(t) is increasing in t and reaches its maximum at t = t max . For t > t max , the good is not exported andḠ(t) = π D f (0).
The privatization procedure
In practise, different types of measures have been used to privatize former stateowned enterprises. Several western countries employed various kinds of auctions to sell state-owned enterprises to the highest bidder. In some transition countries, a substantial fraction of the shares of all Þrms were given to the general population for free. In Eastern Germany, the Treuhandanstalt bargained on the terms of trade and negotiated employment and investment guarantees. Most privatization programs combined several elements of these basic methods. 18 In order to focus on the market forces as the determinant of the equilibrium buyer and the equilibrium market structure, we assume that the government sells the state assets to the highest bidder at an auction. More speciÞcally, the privatization process is depicted as an auction where the two Þrms post bids and the bidder with the highest bid obtains the state assets. The winning buyer pays an amount equal to his bid. The bids are assumed to be made simultaneously.
19 18 See Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997). 19 All Þrms are completely informed about their own and other Þrms' characteristics. This allows us to clearly attribute the market force effects, as opposed to, say, problems of incomplete information. Moreover, almost no literature derives optimal mechanisms for the selling of objects which cause externalities on other potential buyers. As far as we know, Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) and (1999) are the only papers on this subject.
A bid (strategy) by one of the potential buyers is a real number b i ∈ R. The sales mechanism α of the government is a function from R 2 to {1, 2}, deÞning a winner.
Definition 1. The sales mechanism α allocates the state assets to the firm posting the highest bid for the assets. If more than one firm posts such a bid, each such firm obtains the assets with equal probability.
The auctions will be solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies.
There is assumed to be a smallest monetary unit, denoted ε. We assume ties to be randomly broken, and all equalities in valuations to be ruled out. The smallest amount ε is chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added or subtracted.
Let us now turn to the Þrms' valuations of an arbitrary distribution of the state assets. Generally, these valuations do not only depend on the identity of Þrm i, but also on the identity of the Þrm that will obtain the assets if Þrm i does not.
Some notation is required in order to deÞne a Þrm's valuation. The case where the state assets are liquidated is used as a reference point for interpretational convenience, and the proÞt for Þrm i is then denoted π i0 . Similarly, we let π ij denote the proÞt made by Þrm i when Þrm j has acquired the state assets and π ii the proÞt made by Þrm i when it has acquired the state assets itself. Then, the valuation for Þrm i, v ij , is deÞned:
Thus, the valuation of obtaining the assets for Þrm i is the proÞt increase caused by its asset expansion plus the change in proÞts avoided by preventing Þrm j from acquiring the state assets.
In the case with two Þrms in the industry, the analysis is straightforward as is shown by the following lemma:
20 Lemma 1. Let firm i be the firm with the highest valuation. The state assets are then acquired by firm i, at a price equal to the other firm's, firm j's, valuation of obtaining the state assets instead of firm i, v ji .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The equilibrium market structure
To proceed, one more deÞnition is required. To this end consider the situation where no greenÞeld investment takes place. Let t * be the value of the trade cost satisfying the following equality:
* is the trade cost at which the foreign and the domestic Þrms' valuations of the state assets coincide, given that no greenÞeld investment takes place. We are now set to derive the equilibrium market structures in the international oligopoly presented above. The game is solved backwards and the following Proposition identiÞes the equilibrium buyer, the equilibrium market structure and the equilibrium auction price.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium buyer, the equilibrium auction price and the equilibrium market structure are as follows:
(i) If G >Ḡ(t) and t > t * , the domestic firm obtains the assets at a price
(ii) If G >Ḡ(t) and t < t * , the foreign firm obtains the assets at a price
(iii) If G <Ḡ(t), the foreign firm obtains the assets at a price v df = 0. The market structure is M (k P , k S ).
Proof. See the Appendix. Consequently, the domestic Þrm obtains the state assets.
Second, in the case with low greenÞeld costs, i.e. when G <Ḡ(t), the Proposition shows that the foreign Þrm obtains the state assets. The foreign Þrm will now switch from exports to greenÞeld production in the case where it has not obtained the state-assets. This implies that the domestic Þrm can no longer prevent the foreign Þrm from enhancing its competitiveness in the product market and is thus not willing to pay a high price for the state assets.
Why do low greenfield costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions?
The model above suggests that low greenÞeld costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions. This seems counterintuitive at Þrst sight, since lower greenÞeld costs would be expected to lead to more greenÞeld entry rather than entry by acquisition, and that lower trade costs would lead to more exports rather than entry. However, below this result is shown to be intuitive, when taking into account that the levels of greenÞeld costs and trade costs affect the acquisition price.
First, observe that the aggregate proÞts in the different market structures play an important role for determining the equilibrium buyer. To see this, note that Lemma 1 implies that the Þrm with the highest valuation obtains the state assets.
where Π i is the aggregate proÞt when Þrm i obtains the state assets and Π j is the aggregate proÞt when Þrm j obtains them. Thus, the aggregate proÞt in the market will play an important role for determining the equilibrium buyer. greenÞeld investment and exports, we have two cases to consider. This is illustrated in Þg 3.1(ii), whereḠ(t) is traced out in the tG−space. Points aboveḠ(t) then correspond to the case when greenÞeld investment is not proÞtable, whereas points belowḠ(t) correspond to the case where it is. Figures 3.1(i) and (ii) depict aggregate proÞts in each of these cases. In the ensuing subsections, we will study at the two separate cases more closely.
High greenfield costs
Let us now characterize aggregate proÞts when the foreign Þrm will not invest greenÞeld in stage 2 upon losing the auction in stage 1, as investment costs are 21 Fosfuri et al (2000) show that the aggregate proÞt will determine whether a MNE will export or invest abroad by instructing local workers. To explain the shape of aggregate proÞt in the latter case, let the aggregate proÞt be expressed as
the Appendix, differentiating Π with respect to q d , q f , and t and using the foc's yields:
The Þrst term in Equation (3.1) captures the anti-competitive effect due to the fact that an increased trade cost induces the foreign Þrm to be less aggressive in its market interaction, which softens competition and increases the revenues for the domestic Þrm. The second term reßects the decrease in total trade costs as the domestic Þrm steals business from the foreign Þrm. This effect is referred to as the business stealing effect. The third term, the direct trade cost effect, reduces aggregate proÞts relative to the initial position, as the foreign Þrm faces higher trade costs.
The U-shape of Π(t) can then be understood as follows. When t is zero, the sales of the foreign Þrm are large and an increase in trade costs t has a relatively strong negative impact on aggregate proÞts through the direct trade cost effect.
In addition, the business stealing effect is zero, since the Þrms' costs are the same. Moreover, the anti-competitive effect is limited, for the increased market price induced by reduced industry supply then affects a smaller number of units produced by the domestic Þrm.
It turns out that at t = 0, the trade cost effect dominates the anti-competitive effect. At higher trade costs, however, the direct trade cost effect is weaker since the foreign Þrm's exports are smaller. On the other hand, both the anticompetitive and the business stealing effects are stronger, since the domestic Þrm has a larger market share, and each unit shifted from the foreign Þrm to the domestic Þrm implies larger cost savings. Hence, aggregate proÞts will rise, once trade costs become sufficiently high. When trade costs become sufficiently high at t = t max , the domestic Þrm becomes a monopolist and aggregate proÞts are maximized.
Whether aggregate proÞts are maximized with the domestic or the foreign
Þrms as the buyer depends on the balance between the incentive to form Π(0)
to avoid the higher trade cost, and the anti-competitive and business stealing incentive to form Π(t).
can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that G >Ḡ(t), then
When trade costs are low, the domestic Þrm can no longer prevent the foreign
Þrm from becoming a tough competitor and thus, its willingness to pay for the state assets decreases. Consequently, a foreign acquisition is then more likely.
Low greenfield costs
In this case, the foreign Þrm will invest greenÞeld in stage 2 upon losing the auction in stage 1, as investment costs are sufficiently low, i. we obtain the following result, illustrated by Þgure 3.1(iii):
Intuitively, the lower greenÞeld cost decreases the domestic Þrm's willingness to pay, since the foreign Þrm can credibly threaten to enter greenÞeld, if it does not obtain the state assets. At the same time, the foreign Þrm is willing to pay G for the state assets and obtains them.
Policy
A central question is whether the privatization procedure selects the socially most preferred buyer. A fundamental problem in determining the most preferred buyer is that the equilibrium price of the state asset is affected by government policy.
The endogenous nature of the buyer's identity and the auction price in the present analysis, as well as the international dimension, imply that the optimal design of policy is very complicated. Therefore, we will make a couple of remarks on policy that might indicate areas worthy of future investigations.
National Treatment Clauses in Privatizations
The basic idea behind national treatment clauses is the commitment of countries to treat foreign-controlled Þrms operating in their territories no less favorably than domestic enterprises in similar situations. In the policy debate on FDI, it has been of concern that FDI might "crowd out" domestic investments and shift proÞts from domestic to foreign Þrms. 22 Here, we will illuminate the concept of national 22 World Investment Report, 1999.
treatment in the context of privatizations. More speciÞcally, we compare two policies: (i) a national treatment (NT) policy, where no discrimination between domestic and foreign buyers occurs, and (ii) a protectionism (P) policy, where only domestic buyers are allowed to acquire the state assets. 23 The conventional welfare evaluation of M&As and market structures in an international oligopoly is typically made by comparing the sum of domestic consumer surplus and domestic proÞts in different market structures. We follow this approach but add the sales price of the state assets into the domestic welfare measure. It then follows that the NT and P policies only differ when the foreign 
There are three terms in W NT f : First, the sale of the state assets generates revenues. As shown in Lemma 1, the foreign Þrm pays the valuation of the domestic Þrm, i.e. v df . The second term is the consumer surplus when the foreign Þrm is the equilibrium buyer, denoted CS f . The consumer surplus depends on the trade cost faced by the foreign Þrm and thus CS f = CS(0) and CS d = CS(t). Finally, the domestic Þrm's proÞt when the state assets are in the hands of the foreign Þrm is π df . 23 Note that we focus on the effects in Country H and thus abstract from the effects in Country F. Moreover, we abstract from how the policies are determined. W P d are derived in the same fashion. Note that since the sales price for the state assets is just a redistribution from the domestic Þrm to the domestic government, the sales price is not included in W P d . We can then rewrite (4.1):
This (weak) inequality always holds since aggregate output will be higher in the market structure without trade costs: When greenÞeld entry is not credible, G > G(t), foreign ownership increases consumer surplus and, hence, welfare since either the trade cost, or the monopoly position of the domestic Þrm is avoided. When greenÞeld entry is credible, G <Ḡ(t), foreign and domestic ownership lead to the same welfare, since the selling price is zero and the consumer surplus will be the same under either Þrm's acquisition.
Hence, we conclude: This result also illustrates a fundamental difference between foreign entry in the context of acquisition and greenÞeld investment. In the case where only greenÞeld entry is an option, the above reasoning concerning the consumer effect is still valid. However, the rent shifting effect will now have different welfare effects.
To see this, note that, when entering, the foreign Þrm will pay a Þxed entry cost G which only covers the opportunity cost in terms of factor inputs. However, the negative effect on the domestic Þrm's proÞt is not "paid for". Consequently, the issue of national treatment in the context of M & A differs from the context of greenÞeld, since in the former, but not in the latter, some of the rent shifting created by the investment is partly paid for by the foreign investor. CS d + π dd , when the domestic Þrm obtains the state assets.
(4.
3)
The design of investment and trade policy will be complicated by the fact that it does not only affect the Þrms' incentives for greenÞeld investment and exports, 25 but also affects the sales price at the auction. In order to simplify the analysis, we make the following assumption:
In Þgure 4.1, we illustrate how welfare is affected by investment and trade policy. The corresponding equilibrium market structures are indicated by arrows.
Trade policy: Trade costs affect both the price paid at the auction and the identity of the buyer. When greenÞeld costs are sufficiently high and trade costs are low, G >Ḡ(t) and t < t * , the foreign Þrm obtains the state assets. A small increase in trade costs then implies that the foreign Þrm still obtains the state assets, but must pay a higher price for these assets, since the domestic Þrm's valuation has increased, due to the strengthened anti-competitive effect of higher trade costs (c.f equation (3.1) ). Consequently, welfare increases since the product market equilibrium is unaffected. Thus, we have the following result:
26 Corollary 2. Increased trade barriers can increase domestic welfare without increasing the profit of the domestic firm or the tax income by forcing a foreign buyer to pay more for the state assets. However, a larger increase might lead to the domestic Þrm obtaining the state assets. The government then no longer extracts foreign proÞts. Moreover, the domestic Þrm's acquisition leads to lower consumer surplus, since the price in the product market will be higher. These two effects outweigh the effect of increased proÞts for the domestic Þrm, leading to lower aggregate welfare, as shown in Þgure 4.1. Moreover, if trade costs are increased for medium size investment costs, this might lead to the foreign Þrm having a credible greenÞeld threat This, in turn, might lead to a loss in sales revenues as the domestic Þrm's valuation of the state assets falls to zero.
Investment policy: Investment subsidies might reduce welfare, also when it leads to increased investments and when associated with no direct costs. By encouraging FDI through greenÞeld entry, the revenues from selling the state assets decrease, since the value for the domestic Þrm of owning the state assets decreases. For example, if greenÞeld costs are sufficiently high and trade costs are low, that is G >Ḡ(t) and t < t * , the foreign Þrm obtains the state assets.
If investment costs are reduced, this might lead to a loss of sales revenues if G is reduced belowḠ(t), as the domestic Þrm's valuation of the state assets falls to zero. This implies that the government can no longer extract foreign proÞts.
Since the product market equilibrium is unaffected, we have the following result:
27 Corollary 3. Investment subsidies to foreign firms might reduce domestic welfare, since these do not necessarily increase investments but only reduce the sales price of the state assets.
Finally, the Þgure also illustrates that welfare will jump discontinuously from changes in trade and investment policy as this leads to changes in the equilibrium market structure. 28 It turns out that the highest welfare in the model will be for high greenÞeld costs and medium high trade costs. The reason is that the sales price increases with the trade costs in this interval, as it leads to a stronger anticompetitive and business stealing effect and a weaker trade cost savings effect (c.f equation (3.1) ).
Robustness of results
The model in this paper is obviously restrictive in several respects. In this section, we show that the mechanisms highlighted in the model are also at work in a more general set-up. Three different extensions will be considered separately;
(a) allowing for more general assumptions about costs, demand, and mode of 27 This result would be strengthened if assuming investment subsidies not to be costless. 28 Horstmann and Markusen (1992) showed that these jumps are a characteristic of markets with MNEs. Some more notation is need before proceeding: k 0 denotes the private domestic
Þrm's initial capital stock, whereas k P denotes the capital stock generated by either of the Þrms by investing in period 2. Let Þrm w (winner) be the Þrm that obtained the state asset in period 1, and Þrm l (loser) the Þrm that did not. Then, use π kw,k l w (t) as short-hand for proÞts, where k w is the number of assets possessed by Þrm w, whereas k l is the number of assets in Þrm l.
For a high enough greenÞeld costs, it follows that no Þrm invests in the greenÞeld game in period 2. Lemma 1 then establishes that the domestic Þrm obtains the assets iff π
(0) and the foreign Þrm obtains the assets iff the inequality is reversed. It then follows that the inequality holds for a sufficiently large t, since the domestic Þrm becomes a monopolist if obtaining the state assets. Moreover, if cost synergies are assumed to be associated with combining the state assets with private assets, the reasoning above also holds.
Second, the observation that low greenÞeld costs for foreign Þrms lead to foreign acquisitions is not speciÞc to the above model either. To see this, consider the situation where the foreign Þrm, but not the domestic Þrm, would invest greenÞeld if the other Þrm obtained the state assets, and where no Þrm would make an additional investment. It then follows from Lemma 1 that the foreign Þrm obtains the assets iff π 
. This condition holds for a sufficiently large t and for sufficiently large cost synergies associated with combining the state assets with private assets.
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For low enough greenÞeld costs, it follows that foreign Þrms invest in the greenÞeld game in period 2. From the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, it then follows that there exists an equilibrium where a foreign Þrm obtains the state assets if π
Thus, the Þnding that low greenÞeld costs and low trade costs are conducive to foreign acquisitions and high greenÞeld costs and high trade costs are conducive to domestic acquisitions extends to a multi-Þrm setting. 29 Note that in the Cournot model, with two domestic Þrms or more, without complementarity between state and private assets, it can be shown that the foreign Þrm will always acquire the SOE. On the other hand, if Þrms compete a la Bertrand with differentiated products, the result that a domestic Þrm acquires the state assets at high trade costs holds. The reason is that all Þrms beneÞt from a domestic Þrm obtaining the state assets, since higher trade costs weaken price competition.
Bilateral trade and investments
Consider now a situation where the domestic Þrm could export or invest in the market in country F. Assume the markets to be segmented on the demand side.
It then follows that the results derived in the model still hold. To see this, note that the domestic Þrm's costs are not affected by whether it obtains the state assets. Furthermore, note that a foreign Þrm will never export from its foreign location to its home country, since its costs are at least as low producing in its domestic market. Consequently, allowing for exports and foreign investment by the domestic Þrm will not affect the results derived here. If there are cost synergies associated with combining the state assets with private assets, the analysis will be more complicated, however, since a domestic Þrm's level of exports might be affected by whether it obtains the state assets or not. However, the same reasoning as for the proof of Lemma 1 still applies, so that the aggregate proÞts in the market play an important role as the determinant of the equilibrium buyer.
Consequently, the mechanisms identiÞed here still play a role for determining the equilibrium buyer.
Concluding discussion
This paper determines the emerging equilibrium market structure in a mixed international oligopoly where the state enterprise is sold at an auction. The model suggests that low greenÞeld costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions.
The reason is that domestic Þrms can then not prevent foreign Þrms from becoming locally strong competitors and thus, their willingness to pay for the state assets are low.
The paper points to the fact that the potential negative effects of a national treatment clause through crowding out is partly mitigated in privatizations, since the negative impact on domestic Þrms created by the acquisition is partly paid for by the foreign investor in the bidding competition over the state assets. The paper also points to the fact that investment and trade policies can be used strategically to improve the outcome of the privatization procedure by increasing the selling price.
The issue of optimal design of the privatization policy has not been addressed here. The complexity of the externalities involved in the selling of the state assets indicates that informational constraint will be important for deriving optimal policies. A natural step, however, is to explicitly model this restriction and to investigate whether selling rules incurring a higher welfare level than the ones using only information about nationality, might be found.
A. Appendix A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
In this proof, we will use the following more general notation of the valuation of the state-assets: Generally, the valuations of the state assets do not only depend on the identity of Þrm i, but also on the identity of the Þrm obtaining the assets, Þrm j, and on the identity of the Þrm that will obtain the assets if Þrm j does not, that is, Þrm h. Some notation is required in order to deÞne a Þrm's valuation. Let us now show that this is the only Nash equilibrium. 
where D = P 0 [3P 0 + P 00 Q] > 0 and Q = q d + q f . We can then deÞne aggregate proÞts as a function of t:
Taking the total derivative in t and using (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4), (A.6) can be written:
Using the Þrst-order conditions (A.3) and (A.4) and that
hold, (A.7) can be rewritten as:
A.4. Proof of Lemma 2
First, we rewrite Π(t) by inserting (A.5) into (A.7). DeÞning the elasticities β Q = P 00 P 0 Q and β q d = P 00 P 0 q d , (A.7) can be written:
We then proceed by deriving the following Lemma: Proof. If demand P (Q) is concave β Q ≥ 0 and β q d ≥ 0, since P 0 < 0 and P 00 ≤ 0.
Then:
(i) At t = 0, we must have q d = q f , which implies dΠ dt (0) = −q 2+β Q 3+β Q < 0.
(ii) At t = t max , Þrm d becomes a monopolist and thus Π(t max ) > Π(0). 
